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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000884-CA 
vs. 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a sentence for attempted joy riding with intent to 
temporarily deprive owner, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-la-1314 (1997) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1973), in the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should this court adjudicate the merits of defendant's appeal, where 
defendant is a fugitive from the law? 
This is a question of law, reviewable for correctness. See Hardy v. Morris, 
636 P.2d 473 (Utah 1981). 
2. Did the trial court err when it found that defendant, who had notice of his 
sentencing hearing and was free to attend, was voluntarily absent? 
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991). Review of factual findings is for 
clear error. See id. Whether a defendant has voluntarily absented himself is a 
question of fact reviewed for clear error. See Johnson v. State, 604 S.W.2d 927, 
929 (Ark. 1980) (finding of voluntary absence not "clearly wrong"); Frost v. United 
States, 618 A.2d 653, 657 (D.C. 1992) (finding of voluntary absence not "clearly 
erroneous"); cf. State v. Reed, 992 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (review of 
voluntary absence determination for abuse of discretion"). 
3. Should this Court adopt the novel rule, not asserted below, that a trial 
court may only sentence a voluntarily absent defendant if he was previously warned 
that sentencing could proceed in his absence? 
This is a question of law, and review is for correctness. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 
1049. 
4. Did the district court have an affirmative duty to expressly solicit 
information in mitigation, where defense counsel was present, but made no request 
to present information and did not object to sentencing without it? 
2 
A question of law, this issue is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant to the 
statutory indeterminate term? 
An appellate court "will not reverse or modify a sentence prescribed by law 
unless it is clearly excessive or unless the trial court abused its discretion." State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). "The appellate court can properly find 
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." Id. at 887. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 18, 2000, defendant was charged with unlawful control over a motor 
vehicle with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314. On August 8 
defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful control over a motor vehicle, a class 
A misdemeanor. R. 63:5. The trial judge accepted his plea, released him to pretrial 
services, told him to make an appointment with Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) 
for preparation of a presentence report (PSI), and notified him of his sentencing 
hearing on September 22, 2000. R. 63:5, 7-8. 
Defendant failed to appear at AP&P as instructed. R. 41. Pre-trial services 
notified the court that defendant had not reported and they had been unable to 
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contact him. R. 34. The court revoked defendant's release and issued a non-
bailable bench warrant for his arrest. R. 39. 
Defendant also failed to appear at sentencing. R. 64:2. Noting defendant's 
two failures to appear and the warrant for his arrest, the court found that defendant 
had voluntarily failed to appear. Id. The court then sentenced him in absentia to 
the statutory one-year indeterminate term. Id. 
Defense counsel timely appealed defendant's conviction. R. 47. Defense 
counsel concedes that defendant's name did not appear on the jail roster for Salt 
Lake County on the day his opening brief was filed. Br. Aplt. at 25 n.4. Defendant 
is apparently still at large, as the district court docket does not indicate a subsequent 
recall of the bench warrant for defendant's arrest. Docket, Third District Court-Salt 
Lake, Case No. 001906887 (Addendum, attached).1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement, defendant was at his girlfriend's 
home, became drunk and angry, and drove away in her car without her permission. 
R. 3. Defendant's relative telephoned the following day and gave the girlfriend the 
vehicle's location. She then retrieved the vehicle. Id. 
!The State requests that this Court take judicial notice of the trial court docket in 
this case as permitted by Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Riche v. Riche, 
784 P.2d 465,468 (Ut. App. 1989) (court "may take judicial notice of the records and 
prior proceedings in the same case"); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 
758 P.2d 451, 456 & n.4 (Ut. App. 1988) (appellate court may take judicial notice to 
affirm). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant is a fugitive from justice. He is not entitled to call upon this 
Court to decide his appeal. 
2. The trial court properly sentenced defendant in absentia. Its finding that 
defendant was voluntarily absent is not clearly erroneous. 
3. A trial court may properly sentence a voluntarily absent defendant even 
though he has not been warned that sentencing may proceed in his absence. 
4. Although a trial court must allow defense counsel to present mitigating 
information, the court has no affirmative duty to expressly solicit mitigating 
information or request that defense counsel make a presentation. 
5. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it sentenced 
defendant to the statutory term. Defendant has pointed to no relevant information 
the court failed to consider. Further, defendant has not demonstrated that the 
sentence was one that "no reasonable man" would have imposed. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
Defendant, a fugitive from justice, cannot call 
on this Court to decide his appeal. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant in 
absentia and requests that this Court vacate his sentence. Br. Aplt. at 14, 31. 
Defendant, who was free on release, did not appear at sentencing and has not 
5 
subsequently appeared. Although the court has issued a bench warrant for his 
arrest, he remains at large. Because defendant is a fugitive from justice, this Court 
should decline to adjudicate his claims. 
Under "the settled rule of Hardy v. Morris" a fugitive defendant "places 
himself beyond the reach of the judicial system and any ruling cannot be enforced 
against him; therefore, he should not be allowed to pursue an appeal while out of 
custody." State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985) (citing Hardy, 636 P.2d at 
473).2 "The dismissal of such an appeal is justified on the theory that the [fugitive] 
should not be allowed to reap the benefit of a decision in his favor when the state 
could not enforce a decision in its favor." Hardy, 636 P.2d at 474. 
Defendant, who was conditionally released to pre-trial services, did not appear 
for either preparation of his presentence report or for sentencing. While a bench 
warrant for his arrest has issued, defendant is still at large. Assuming he remains at 
large, he cannot claim the privilege "to call upon the resources of the Court for 
determination of his claims." Id. 
Defendant states that Tuttle "call[s] the holding of Hardy into question." Br. 
Aplt. at 27. It does not. Tuttle merely held that a defendant may be entitled to 
2
 Similarly, in the federal courts, "[i]t has been settled for well over a century that 
an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice 
during the pendency of his appeal." Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 
239(1993). 
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reinstatement of his appeal after he has been returned to custody.3 Tuttle neither 
rejected nor undermined Hardy's rule. The Tuttle court simply stated that "[o]nce 
Tuttle was returned to custody, this Court's power again extended to Tuttle and the 
rationale of Hardy no longer applie[d]." 713 P.2d at 704. In the case at bar, in 
contrast, defendant has not been returned to custody, and the rationale of Hardy 
therefore does apply. 
Defendant also attempts to distinguish Hardy, where the defendant was an 
escaped prisoner, from this case because here "[defendant] has not escaped . . . . 
[defendant] simply did not appear at sentencing." Br. Aplt. at 28. Further, 
defendant argues, Hardy escaped after he had initiated his appeal; defendant's 
appeal was initiated during his absence. Id. 
While the procedural posture of this case differs slightly from that in Hardy, 
the difference is irrelevant. In this case, as in Hardy, defendant has "placed himself 
outside the control of the judicial system" and "a ruling adverse to him cannot be 
enforced." 636 P.2d at 474. Hardy, in fact, made no distinction between the 
z
 Tuttle rejected the reasoning of State v. Brady, 655 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1982), 
that an escaped defendant had "abandoned his appeal," thereby foreclosing reinstatement 
of the appeal upon his return to custody. Tuttle held that appeals "may be reinstated 
unless the State can show that it has been prejudiced by the defendant's absence and the 
consequent lapse of time." 713 P.2d at 705. State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255 (Utah 
1996), illustrates the exception. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court's 
denial of Verikokides' motion for a new trial, despite his argument that the loss of a trial 
transcript made meaningful appeal impossible. Id. at 1255. Any loss of a meaningful 
appeal was the "unavoidable result of his long absence from the jurisdiction." Id. at 
1258. 
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appeals of criminal defendants who fail to surrender themselves after they have been 
freed on bail and those who escape, citing and quoting from cases in both postures. 
See id. (citing Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (failure to 
surrender after release on bail) and Golden v. State, 243 S.E.2d 303, 304 (Ga. App. 
1978) (escape)). 
Finally, defendant argues that State v. Moya, 815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 
1991), supports appellate review of Samora's claims. Br. Aplt. at 28. It does not. 
Moya, which addressed a unique and convoluted factual scenario, is wholly 
distinguishable. Nothing in the Moya record substantiated the claim that Moya was 
a fugitive from the Utah justice system. 815 P.2d at 1313 n.l. Moya never escaped 
custody in Utah. Id. Whether he was absent from supervision was "irrelevant'' 
where "supervision over him terminated by operation of law long before his alleged 
fugitive status arose." Id. 
Defendant, on the other hand, is a fugitive from justice. Supervision over him 
did not terminate: rather, he did not conform to the requirements of his supervised 
release and did not appear. 
In sum, Hardy controls this case. Defendant, a fugitive from justice, cannot 
call on this Court to decide his appeal. No precedent cited by defendant 
distinguishes Hardy. 
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Point II 
The trial court properly sentenced defendant in absentia. 
Defendant states that the record does not establish a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his right to be present and defend at sentencing. Br. Aplt. at 15. In 
support of this claim, defendant appears to argue that the record does not 
demonstrate that he was voluntarily absent. See Br. Aplt. at 15. Defendant's 
argument on this point is a challenge to the court's finding of fact, and appellate 
review is for clear error.4 See Johnson v. State, 604 S.W.2d at 929; Frost v. United 
States, 618 A.2d 653, 657 (D.C. 1992). 
defendant mistakenly relies on State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App. 
1996), for the applicable standard of review. See Br. Aplt. at 2. Citing Ham, defendant 
argues that whether he was or was not voluntarily absent should be reviewed for 
correctness. Ham applies the correctness standard to the ultimate issue of whether 
consent to search has been voluntarily given. Whether consent has been voluntarily given 
is not a mere question of fact, i.e., of whether a defendant agreed to a search, but requires 
that the court consider whether the defendant's agreement was sufficiently uncoerced to 
be treated as legally voluntary. When reviewing the voluntariness of a consent to search, 
the appellate court must balance "the legitimate need for such searches and the equally 
important requirement of assuring an absence of coercion." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Voluntariness in the context of a defendant's absenting 
himself from trial, on the other hand, requires no review for coercion and no balancing of 
competing interests. It is, rather, a mere factual inquiry. 
Further, even if the question were a mixed question of law and fact, defendant 
could not meet the "plain error" standard applicable for unpreserved claims. Error, if any, 
was not obvious for the same reasons it was not clear. Additionally, error is not obvious 
where "no settled appellate law" should have guided the trial court. State v. Ross, 951 
P.2d 236, 239 (Ut. App. 1997). Defendant has pointed to no Utah precedent suggesting 
that a defendant, having notice of his sentencing hearing and released from custody, may 
not be found voluntarily absent. 
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The controlling case in this jurisdiction is State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 
(Utah 1996). In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant is 
voluntarily absent when he receives notice of the hearing and is "free to attend" in 
the sense that he is "not incarcerated elsewhere." Id. at 1110. 
The record in this case indicates that defendant had notice and was not 
incarcerated. Defendant and his counsel both received notice of the sentencing date 
and time at the plea hearing. R. 63:8. Defendant was released from custody on 
August 28, 2000, almost a month before sentencing. R. 34. The trial court's 
finding that defendant was voluntarily absent is therefore not clearly erroneous. 
Furthermore, in determining whether a defendant is voluntarily absent, this 
Court has implicitly held that its review of a trial court's voluntariness decision may 
extend to evidence developed subsequent to the trial court's ruling. See State v. 
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 988 (Ut App. 1989) (reviewing affidavit filed with motion 
for a new trial eight months after trial in absentia). This approach is also consistent 
with the express holdings of other jurisdictions. Reasoning that the validity of a 
trial court's voluntariness decision will be clearer in hindsight, these jurisdictions 
hold that appellate courts may consider evidence not before the trial court. See, e.g., 
Moore, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc). To exclude post-
ruling evidence would make it difficult for a defendant to show involuntary absence 
when moving to correct an illegal sentence. See id. Likewise, to preclude such 
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evidence would hinder an appellate court's ability to accurately review the trial 
court's finding of voluntariness. See id. 
In the instant case, post-sentencing entries in the district court docket 
demonstrate that defendant has made no effort to contact the court to explain his 
absence. See Docket, Third District Court-Salt Lake, Case No. 001996887. The 
court's bench warrant, issued on September 20, 2000, remains outstanding. 
Finally, Anderson implicitly holds that a defendant who has notice and is not 
incarcerated carries the burden of proffering some "sound reason" to support a 
contention that his absence was not voluntary. 929 P.2d at 1100; see also Wagstajf, 
772 P.2d at 990) ("If [defendant's] absence is deliberate without a sound reason, the 
trial court may start in his absence."). Anderson's implicit holding is consistent 
with precedent in other jurisdictions expressly holding that a defendant, having 
notice of his trial or sentencing proceeding and not incarcerated, has the burden of 
at least proffering some evidence that his absence was involuntary. See United 
States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that where defendant 
knew trial date and where no evidence suggested an enforced absence, defendant 
"ha[d] the burden of going forward and offering evidence to refute the 
[voluntariness] finding of the trial court"); State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 277 
(Minn. 1998) (holding that a "defendant bears the burden of showing that his or her 
absence from trial was voluntary"); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. Ct. 
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App. 1981) ("When a defendant is free on bond and does not appear at the time 
specified, it is presumed, until established otherwise, that his absence is voluntary 
for the purpose of deciding whether he has waived his right to be present at trial."); 
Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d at 261 ("Absent any evidence from the defendant to 
refute the trial court's determination that his absence was voluntary, we will not 
disturb the trial court's finding."). 
In the instant case, defendant had notice and had been released from custody. 
He did not, however, proffer any reason for his absence from sentencing. He did 
not meet the burden of going forward to present some "sound reason" for his 
absence. 
In sum, the trial court did not clearly err in finding defendant voluntarily 
absent. The record demonstrates both that defendant had notice of sentencing and 
that he was free to attend in the sense that he was not incarcerated. Evidence 
developed after sentencing supports the trial court's finding. Finally, defendant did 
not, either at sentencing or at any time thereafter, proffer a reason for his absence. 
Nothing in the record suggests that defendant's absence was involuntary. 
Point III 
A trial court may sentence a voluntarily absent defendant even though 
he has not been warned that sentencing may proceed in his absence. 
Defendant argues that sentencing cannot proceed, even though a defendant 
may be voluntarily absent, unless he has been warned that he can be sentenced in 
12 
absentia. See Br. Aplt. at 15. Defendant asserts that a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the right to presence is not possible without a warning. See id. 
To establish plain error, as defendant must since the claim is unpreserved, he 
must show that (i) an error occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error 
was harmful. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Error, if any, was not obvious. "Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial 
court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court:' See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). No Utah precedent 
imposes a warning requirement. 
In any event, no error occurred. Defendant's insistence on a warning 
requirement is, in fact, inconsistent with Utah precedent. Anderson details the Utah 
law controlling waiver of the right to presence. Under Anderson, voluntary 
absence—absence after notice where the defendant is free to attend in the sense that 
he is not incarcerated elsewhere—effects a waiver. "[A] defendant not accused of a 
capital crime waives his right to be present at sentencing by voluntary absence." 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. No warning is required.5 
5Defendant attempts to distinguish Anderson, arguing that no warning was required 
because of its unique procedural posture. The court, however, never entertained the 
possibility that a warning might be required. Rather, the Anderson court explained how, 
under the unique circumstances surrounding the case, sentencing was permissible without 
actual notice to defendant. 
The propriety of sentencing in absentia arose in the trial court after Anderson 
moved for permission to leave the state to visit his parents. The court granted his motion 
upon Anderson's written and oral agreement to be tried in absentia should he fail to 
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The Anderson holding relied on and is consistent with the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Rule 22(b) states: "On the same grounds that a defendant may 
be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's 
absence." Rule 17(a)(2) details those grounds: in non-capital cases, "the 
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present." 
Neither Anderson nor the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure make waiver 
contingent on defendant's having been warned that he may be tried in his absence. 
Further, public policy considerations militate against requiring a warning. 
Anderson explains some of the practical considerations that favor sentencing 
in absentia. These include the possibility that "a defendant might. . . absent himself 
for years," during which a judge might go on to other assignments or retire, trial 
appear for trial. Anderson failed to appear and was tried and sentenced in his absence. 
929P.2datll08. 
On appeal Anderson admitted waiving his right to be present a trial, but objected 
to his sentencing in absentia. He argued that the sentencing procedure violated his rights 
to due process and to allocution. On review, the Utah Supreme Court held that he had 
voluntarily absented himself and waived his right to be present at sentencing. After 
explaining that a defendant must generally have notice and be free from custody, the court 
held that Anderson, who did not have notice of the sentencing proceeding, had 
nevertheless waived his right to presence by his voluntary absence. The court found that 
Anderson's lack of notice was attributable to his own misconduct. "Had he maintained 
contact with pretrial services and with his attorney, as was his duty, he would have known 
of the sentencing date." Id. at 1111. 
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records could be'lost or destroyed, victims might move, or trial counsel could die 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 At the very least, "it would be a waste io iudk ial 
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reason—and w^*,^ wieclose, at least until his apprehension, further proceedings in 
the court. 
Defendant argues for a warning requirementu lying on liuua Mates v. 
Mt : Phet m, ?9 (DX ) 
Anderson's reliance —McPfierson requires that defendant be given notice, or 
warned, that sentencing will occur even if he does not appear, Br. Aplt. at 8 
Anderson, however, meiuly ichcd on MiPherson foi the proposition that a 
"defendant mm ( In /r iHi- »f pi H cedin^s " 
Furthermore, McPherson was effectively overruled by Taylor v. Lnited States 
^j>aylor JJ^ 4 | ^ y g * ric\ni\ M-Pherson, wrho was released on bail during trial 
and l.iilrnl I iiii'liiiiiri " M tiiinil IIIIII ill i IIIIIII i I in ippi ill llic ippdlalr i mill ini uisi ill, 
hold- oon ma\ not have intentionally relinquished his right to be 
present, testify, and confront I he witnesses against him. Because he had not been 
warned that trial could continue without him, the court vacated the judgment and 
remanded for a determination of whether McPherson knew in fact that trial could go 
on without him. 421 F.2d at 1130-31. 
The dissent argued that the issue was not whether McPherson knew that trial 
could proceed in his absence, but whether he knew he had a right to be present and 
waived it. Id. at 1131. 
In United States v. Taylor (Taylor I), 478 F.2d 689 (1st Cir.) (aff'd, 414 U.S. 
17 (1973)), also a case where the defendant absented himself mid-trial, the appellate 
court adopted the reasoning of the McPherson dissent. If a "defendant knew or 
should have known that he had a right to be present, his voluntary absence . . . [is] a 
waiver of that known right." Id. at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted). No 
warning that sentencing will continue in a defendant's absence is necessary because 
"[t]he very statement that a trial will continue or commence at a fixed time, when 
coupled with knowledge of one's right to be present at trial, implies that the 
continuation of the trial, at least in non-capital cases, does not depend on his 
presence." Id. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Taylor and affirmed. 
The Supreme Court, like First Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected Taylor's argument 
that "his mere voluntary absence from his trial [could not] be construed as an 
effective waiver . . . unless it is demonstrated that he knew or had been expressly 
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warned by the trial court nut oni> ihat he had a right to be present but also that the 
trial would continue in his absence." Taylor II, 414 U.S. at 19. Like the court 
brit""", |iie '"""'ii'utint1 "i .Mill h und I'ut the issue was "the right to be present" and that 
"that right w;is effectively w \\\ i <1 In |l'u icfendanf'-f ,l "I • "' in, il^^rncr " <' i 
20. Hie Court determined that no warning was required and reiterated that "a trial 
may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going 
f Hows the reasoning or laxi.jr i and 
rejects the analysis ui uie McPhcr\ ? * IVhfcmlimt\ irhamv nil WI'/VJI'MHH 
is therefore una\ ailing 
Defendant also suggests that Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993) 
s s Supreme 
Court ca^e, picicu ixuic t j ui Qic Jhedcr ;! f • 
Crosby, the Court held rliar F ale 43, a r vre a _::ivdve rule i:^:i ib Utah 
counterpart, proscribes the commencement of a trial in a defendant's absence. The 
L • imencemem i 
... a defendant's absence.
 Auv case was decided on the basis of statute and aid 
not reach any constitutional claim. The case did not address a warning requirement 
• 11nl dues UN HI Mipporl flciciidaiit's argument tnai warning is lequired 
Crosby and Taylor an liiiiliiii i umisis-lent ^uli iln i iiiiiniiiii m inn m hiiiim i iiiif 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. While the rule requires a defendant's 
presence at the commencement of trial, the right to presence may be waived by 
absence during the continuation of trial and at sentencing: 
The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the 
verdict, and the imposition of sentence, will not be prevented and the 
defendant will be considered to have waived the right to be present 
whenever a defendant, initially present at trial, or having pleaded guilty 
or nolo contendere, 
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or 
not the defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to 
remain during trial), 
(2) in a noncapital case, is voluntarily absent at the imposition of 
sentence, or 
(3) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will 
cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in 
conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b). 
The federal rule therefore permits sentencing in absentia where a defendant 
has pleaded guilty and then voluntarily absents himself from sentencing. While the 
rule requires a warning to disruptive defendants, it requires no warning that 
sentencing will proceed if the defendant voluntarily absents himself. The advisory 
committee notes explain the rationale behind the rule. "Delay in conducting the 
sentencing hearing [when a defendant voluntarily flees before sentence is imposed] 
may result in difficulty later in gathering and presenting the evidence necessary to 
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formulate a guideline sentence."6 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 advisory committee's 
notes (1995 amendment ^ le rationale also Mippo?-ts Vuh law permitting 
.cnfenaiijj11, in jLvsci » a tie feudal it volt ;ari., ai^cats himself—the law set 
forth in Anderson and R 
In sum, Utah law permits the trial court to sentence in absentia a defendant 
v .»i, »>> \oiUi,ianly absent from sentencing TA~iere a defendant has notice of the 
I , .. v icioie iree to attciKi. ;>ui aces not, the 
court m;iv proceed to senten* St \ • * as His 
right to be present. He need not be warned that sentencing will proceed in his 
absence. 
!lli twill II'II 'i ('In iili;;li:in,ldiiii""s argument il *\ou!d, in etiect, impose a 
new affirmative duty on trial courts arccpfinii, i»iii|lti |I,I<M*, n- i-n^iing guiliv i culii i;-
to warn all unincarcerated defendants of the possibility of sentencing in absentia. 
.Failure to give the warning would preclude imposition of sentence whenever 
defendants . ""i< nil Il niipiina defendants eat "the 
Ruie 43, as currently codified, permits sentencing, but not commencement of a 
trial, in a defendant's absence. The rule undermines defendant's argument that presence 
is more important at sentencing than at trial. See Br, Aplt, at 10. The federal cases cited 
by defendant in support of this argument interpreted a former version of Rule 43 
Compare United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and United States 
v. Turner, 532 F. Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D. Ca. 1982) (both cited by defendant) with 
United States v. Jordan, 216 F.3d 1248, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2000) and United States v. 
DiPrima, 165 F.R.D. 61 (E.D. Va. 1996) (both interpreting Rule 43 as amended in 1995). 
Ilitir holdings are inconsistent with the current version of the rule, and their statements of 
policy support a position that was rejected when the rule was amended. 
governmental prerogative" to proceed with a trial, including sentencing. Taylor II, 
414 U.S. at 20. 
Point IV 
The trial court had no affirmative duty to expressly solicit 
defense counsel's presentation of mitigating information. 
Defense counsel was present at sentencing, made no attempt to present 
information in mitigation, and made no objection to sentencing without the 
presentation of mitigating information. See R. 42, 64:1-2. Defendant nevertheless 
argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a "full and fair sentencing 
hearing based on relevant and reliable information." Br. Aplt. at 9. In other words, 
defendant argues that the trial court erred because it did not "afford defense counsel 
or the prosecutor the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing." Br. 
Aplt. at 10. 
Specifically, defendant contends that the court erred because Rule 22, Utah R. 
Crim. P., states that "the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment." He argues that 
this rule imposes upon the court an affirmative duty to invite or solicit such 
statements, rather than a duty to allow defendant or his counsel to present 
information if they so request. See Br. Aplt. at 10. 
In support of this interpretation, defendant cites only State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 
115, 118 (Utah 1985). Howell does not support defendant's argument. Affirming a 
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defendant's conviction, the Howell court held that a trial judge may consider 
evidence of unconvicted criminal conduct in exercising his decision to fix a 
•ivtiinv I in'.h lniiii III,ml i, IPIH liiiirn, I he LUUII olvicncd Lhat the statutory 
predecessor of Rule 22 "direct[ed| trial rmul1 o h m i < nlnui1 hum In I I 
defendant and the prosecution" to "insure fairness in the sentencing procedure." Id. 
The court also commented, "Pursuant to this provision, trial judges may receive and 
("ip i^iipt i <c un'.'t-' <>l '"Ml ult'iu.'i1 i urn lining I he defendant in hung the penalty to 
be imposed for the crime committed." Id. (duply •; in Mi M 
Whether the court had an affirmative duty to solicit information in mitigation 
was not at issu- . -^r even the dicta cited by defendant does not support his 
a*-i; ' i . *JCC;-V v»idciicc - " 
a party protiura it without expresslv ^cestin:* , - t. 
A trial court' has substantial discretion w «uii_Lictmg a sentencing hearing and 
imposing a sentence. Sec State v S mmek% 711 P.2d TOT ^09 (Utah 1986); Howell, 
707 * *- ' ruo accretion 
by imposing upon the "trial court an affirmative duty to solicit comment from 
defense counsel (or from,, the prosecution Defense counsel, not the court:,, knows 
n hriht.T -.he possesses iriiorniiiiiou niai ,, oe mitiganng vie can proffei the 
evidence; she can object il th ) 
"coach" the parties. 
Finally, even assuming the trial court had an affirmative duty to request the 
presentation of mitigating (and aggravating) information, error in this case is 
harmless. Defendant points to no relevant mitigating information not already part of 
the record and does not, even on appeal, suggest that such information existed. 
Point V 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it 
sentenced defendant to the statutory indeterminate term. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing 
sentence without considering relevant and reliable information and that this abuse 
constituted "plain error." Br. Aplt at 8-14. Specifically, defendant argues that the 
court may not have been aware that defendant's crime involved no violence and was 
part of a domestic dispute and, in any case, that the sentence was too severe in light 
of his "relatively benign" crime, his employment, and the lack of record evidence of 
an extensive criminal history. See Br. Aplt at 12-13. 
An appellate court "will not reverse or modify a sentence prescribed by law 
unless it is clearly excessive or unless the trial court abused its discretion." State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). "The appellate court can properly find 
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." Id, at 887. 
Defendant alleges that the sentencing court failed to consider several factors: 
that he had been employed at the same place for a year, that the vehicle taken was 
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\u* girlfriend's car, that he had been living with his girlfriend for three years, that he 
n permanently deprive her of the vehicle, and that no violence was 
involve ,ii I I I V:l'"iidjiil .isserls lh.il I he sentencing judge could not 
have 'known about these factors because the plr.'i vi ,i\ nifnnt hHnrr in*tiiini ulge 
and the plea transcript had not been prepared at the time of sentencing. Id. 
A > .. : >c lac tors are relevant, defendant does not show that the trial 
court tirie * i .
 k. , . <*^ er without 
the transcript of the plea hearing, ihc probable L statempr n 
statement of defendant in connection with his plea, and defendant's persci«« 
h • ais employment, to the victim's being his three-year 
domestic partner, and to his L\<II nl 1 i '!!•, !'< rnpin.u«I-, Jepuu, her * f possession. 
See R. 3, 10,. 20-27. ITiis Court m;^ presume that the sentencing - i 
the information before it. See State v Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 ("Utah App, W ) . 
ot state i;;«, w.v -itense was committed without violence, 
AXic offense, howei. n hii m mlnn v \ i mpum ml I mi tin" 1 r piobable cause" 
'•ilement recites only that defendant "was drinking[] and became angry/' took ihr 
y chicle, and drove a v r " ° '5 Nothing in the record suggests that the sentencing 
judge might have thoi1 , s. .; .me with violence. The 
Ahsence of evidence oi testing-r &. i 
2 3 
perhaps irrelevant. Nothing suggests that the court imposed sentence in belief that 
the crime involved violence. 
Defendant also argues that the record lacked evidence of an extensive criminal 
history. Br. Aplt. at 12-13. Nothing suggests that the court imposed sentence on 
the basis of defendant's criminal history. In any case, defendant failed to appear as 
ordered for preparation of his PSI. Because defendant refused to cooperate, AP&P 
did not prepare a PSI, which would have reflected defendant's criminal record, if 
any. He cannot now fault the court for failing to base his sentence on the absence 
of an extensive criminal record. Even if his record is minimal, which he does not 
assert, defendant did not place that information before the court, either by way of a 
PSI or at the sentencing proceeding. 
Defendant points to one piece of information that came in during the plea 
hearing but was not otherwise part of the record. Br. Aplt. at 11. Defendant was 
released to Pre-Trial Services on the condition that he have no contact with the 
victim, his former girlfriend. At the plea hearing, defendant stated that he had some 
personal property, apparently at her home, that had not yet been returned and that 
she was using a cell phone that was in his name. R. 63:6. He asked the judge how 
he could secure possession of these items without contacting the victim. Id. 
On appeal, defendant apparently suggests that the victim's possession of these 
items is a mitigating factor that should have been considered by the sentencing 
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judge Defendant apparently believes that the victim's possession of these items in 
some way justified his offense xr~*u:— : - the record suggests that the victim had 
[("fused in in nun IIUM.* itnii1 in . ..;;y may have been in her possession 
simply because defendant had failed u nick the* 
relationship with her Farther, nothing suggests that the items had a value even 
/.it commensurate wiai rue value of the vehicle taken 
!.. . j-i^ /N* sj I fir u.; *- -i s 
possession of a defendant's property is a factor that should a 
mitigation Further, even had this been legitimate mitigating information that might 
hjw' luTii considered, detendant tailed to identify this or any other factor as 
mitigating inform.Hum .iml i ill il In Ihr uiml » . ,:ouu* a., ^m* 
ordered preparation of a PSI, defendant did not ap 
cannot now fault the court: for failing to consider n 'ormaliui: liiai :;u iiiigm uuw 
plau-d mi Hi I'ULoiiI had Hit I 'M b e e n p r e p a r e c r ther , h e d i d n o t a p p e a r at 
s e n t e n c i n g .and i annul mm I nil iin i n it Id r I nlm > lv niisidi.i nilormation that he 
might have presented by way of allocution. 
counsel, who was present at sentencing, ask to present information 
]
 -••• i igating information—SUCH as -\cn slant's 
uncertain claim about the victim • - ' 
his right to present that information and cannot now fault the court for not 
considering it. 
Defendant's only remaining argument is that the court abused its discretion 
because, under the circumstances before the court, his sentence was too harsh. 
Defendant can prevail on this argument only if his sentence was one that "no 
reasonable man" would impose. See Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887-88. Defendant 
points to no precedent suggesting that a one-year indeterminate sentence for 
attempted joy-riding is excessive. Further, the sentencing court was entitled to 
consider defendant's failures to appear in this case and the likelihood that he was 
not sufficiently responsible for probation. See State v. Hoover, 728 P.2d 689, 691 
(Ariz. App. 1986) (court "entitled to aggravate appellant's sentence on the basis of 
his failure to appear"). 
In sum, defendant has pointed to no relevant mitigating information that the 
sentencing court failed to consider. Even on appeal, defendant has not suggested 
any relevant information he might have presented had he appeared at sentencing or 
had counsel proffered such information in his behalf. In any event, defendant failed 
to appear for preparation of his PSI or at sentencing, thereby waiving his 
opportunities for personal input. Further, defense counsel, who was present at 
sentencing, proffered no mitigating information. Defendant cannot now fault the 
trial court for failure to consider information that he could have, but did not present. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's appeal should be dismissed because he is a fugitive from justice. 
.0 hear the appeal, defendant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on Ma; .uw i. 
MARK I SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
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ssistant Attorney General 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA 
CASE NUMBER 001906887 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 41-1 A-1314 - ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ INTENT TO TEMP 
DEPRIVE OWNR (amended) 
Class A Misdemeanor Plea: August 08, 2000 Guilty 
Disposition: August 08,2000 {Guilty Plea} 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
PARTIES 
Defendant - MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA 
Represented by: JOHN K WEST 
casehist. 142 (4%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] Plaintiff- STATE OF 
UTAH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA 
Offense tracking number: 10982395 
Date of Birth: August 21,1958 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY SHERIFF 
LEA Case Number: 00-40295 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: DAO 00007593 
Sheriff Office Number: 0103075 
Violation Date: March 31,2000 6124 SOUTH 4000 WEST 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 4,619.05 
Amount Paid: 0.00 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 4,619.05 
TRUST TOTALS Trust Due: 250.00 
casehist. 142 (8%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] Amount Paid: 
0.00 
Credit: 0.00 
Trust Balance Due: 250.00 
Balance Payable: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FINE 
Printed: 05/01/01 11:19:40 Page 1 
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CASE NUMBER 001906887 State Felony 
Amount Due: 4,619.05 
Amount Paid: 0.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 4,619.05 
TRUST DETAIL 
casehist. 142 (12%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] Trust Description: 
Attorney Fees 
Recipient: LDA 
Amount Due: 250.00 
Paid In: 0.00 
Paid Out: 0.00 
CASE NOTE 
(PTS revoked, no PSI, failed to appear snt 9/22/00-snt in 
absentia) 
PROCEEDINGS 
04-18-00 Note: CASE FILED BY DET BAILESS-SL COUNTY SHERIFF. DEF 
NON-JAIL. WARRANT ACTIVATED. cynthiav 
04-18-00 Warrant ordered on: April 18, 2000 Warrant Num: 972111101 Bail 
Allowed cynthiav 
Bail amount: 5000.00 
04-18-00 Warrant issued on: April 18, 2000 Warrant Num: 972111101 Bail 
Allowed cynthiav 
Bail amount: 5000.00 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement. 
04-18-00 Case filed by cynthiav cynthiav 
casehist.142 (19%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]06-27-00 Warrant recalled on: 
June 27, 2000 Warrant num: 972111101 caroleo 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
06-27-00 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on June 28, 2000 at 09:30 AM in 
Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. caroleo 
06-27-00 Judge ARRAIGNMENT assigned. caroleo 
06-28-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel barbarrs 
Judge: ROBIN W.REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: barbarrs 
Prosecutor: MERCER, STEPHEN 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: 290 Tape Count: 1687 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
The Information is read. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
casehist.142 (27%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] 
Printed: 05/01/01 11:19:56 Page 2 
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CASE NUMBER 001906887 State Felony 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Legal Defender 
Office to represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: Legal Defender Office 
City: 
Phone: 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 07/06/2000 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
casehist. 142 (32%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] Third District 
Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
06-28-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on July 06, 2000 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge BARRETT. barbarrs 
06-28-00 Note: FILED: Affidavit of Indigency - Judge Reese signed and 
appointed LDA to represent defendant in this case joannelb 
06-28-00 Note: Bail remain $5,000 joannelb 
07-05-00 Filed: Notice of Bond Hearing mauriem 
07-05-00 Filed: Appearance of Counsel by John K. West mauriem 
07-05-00 Filed: formal Request for discovery mauriem 
07-06-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on July 20, 2000 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge ATHERTON. carmellc 
07-06-00 Minute Entry - Roll Call continued carmellc 
Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
PRESENT 
Clerk: carmellc 
Prosecutor: STOTT, ROBERT L. 
Defendant 
Defendants Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K 
Video 
casehist. 142 (41%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] Tape Number: 2000-40 
Tape Count: OFF 
CONTINUANCE 
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of 
Roll Call. 
The motion is granted. 
Deft has pending charges 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 07/20/2000 
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Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
casehist. 142 (46%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] 450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
07-06-00 ROLL CALL Continued. 
07-20-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call terryb 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: PAUL PARKER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN K WEST 
Video 
Tape Number: 314 Tape Count: 30.94 
HEARING 
Case set for Preliminary hearing 8/8 before Judge Reese. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 08/08/2000 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
casehist. 142 (54%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] 450 South State 
SLC,UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
07-25-00 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on August 08,2000 at 09:00 AM in 
Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. terryb 
08-08-00 Judge FREDERICK assigned. marlened 
08-08-00 SENTENCING scheduled on September 22,2000 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. marlened 
08-08-00 Note: Case Bound Over marlened 
08-08-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE marlened 
Judge: ROBIN W.REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: STOTT, ROBERT L. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 12:06 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
casehist. 142 (63%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] 
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report. 
Change of Plea Note 
C/O AMEND TO "ATTEMPTED, CLASS A MISD" ON STATE MOTION 
C/O DEFT RELEASED TO PRE-TRIAL SERVICES - NO CONTACT WITH VICTIM / 
TO PAY FULL RESTITUTION 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. A Sentencing has been set on 9/22/00 at 
08:30 AM in courtroom N41 before Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK. 
08-31-00 Filed: Supervised Release Agreement connieg 
09-18-00 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Request for Revocation cindyb 
09-18-00 Filed order: Request & Order for Revocation of Supervised 
casehist. 142 (69%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] Release 
cindyb 
Judge jfrederi 
Signed September 18,2000 
09-20-00 Notice - WARRANT for Case 001906887 ID 682956 cindyb 
09-20-00 Warrant ordered on: September 20,2000 Warrant Num: 972123539 
No Bail cindyb 
09-20-00 Warrant issued on: September 20,2000 Warrant Num: 972123539 No 
Bail cindyb 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Issue reason: Pretrial Release Revoked. Defendant Fled. 
09-20-00 Filed: Memo from APP (deft failed to contact APP for PSI upon 
release from jail 8/28/00) cindyb 
09-22-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMTTME cindyb 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb 
Prosecutor: MURPHY, J KEVIN 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorneys): WEST, JOHN K 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:25-9:27 
casehist.142 (78%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ 
INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Printed: 05/01/01 11:20:19 Page 5 
AL 
CASE NUMBER 001906887 State Felony 
casehist.142 (84%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $2119.05 
Due: $4619.05 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $2119.05 
Total Principal Due: $4619.05 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Pay fine to The Court. 
The Court finds defendant voluntarily absented himself from 
sentencing proceedings and the Court sentences the defendant in 
absentia. Counsel for the State to prepare the findings and order. 
Defendant to be committed forthwith upon his arrest on this 
Court's bench warrant. 
09-27-00 Trust Account created Total Due: 250.00 cindyb 
casehist.142 (90%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]09-27-00 Fine Account created 
Total Due: 4619.05 cindyb 
09-28-00 Judgment #1 Entered theresab 
Creditor: LDA 
Debtor: MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA 
250.00 Attorneys Fee's 
250.00 Judgment Grand Total 
09-28-00 Filed judgment: Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment @J theresab 
Judge jfrederi 
Signed September 22, 2000 
10-10-00 Filed order: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Sentencing Defendant in Absentia cindyb 
Judge jfrederi 
Signed October 10,2000 
10-17-00 Filed: Notice of Appeal rhondam 
10-17-00 Filed: Request for Transcript rhondam 
10-18-00 Note: Forwarded Cert/copies of Notice of Appeal, Designation of 
Record, Certificate, and Request for Transcript to Court of 
Appeals susanc 
10-23-00 Filed: Court of Appeals letter to John K. West - Notice of 
Appeal filed with Court of Appeals/COA # 20000884-CA kathys 
10-27-00 Filed: Transcript of hearing 9-22-00 sharonb 
10-27-00 Filed: Transcript of hearing 8-8-00 sharonb 
casehist.142 (99%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help] 
Printed: 05/01/01 11:20:19 Page 6 (last) 
AL 
casehist.142: END[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for 
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SAMORA, MANUEL ERNESTO 001906887 FS 08/21/58 DEF COS J FREDERICK 1 
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